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The scientific evidence on how man-made emissions of greenhouse gases
affect global climate is not yet conclusive, but in spite of this, many policy-makers
have proposed various policies to reduce these emissions. Carbon dioxide is the
single most significant man-made greenhouse gas (GHG). One of the most
common policy prescriptions for slowing greenhouse gas emissions is a "carbon
tax:" a tax on fossil fuels in proportion to the amount of atmospheric carbon
dioxide that is released when they are burned. It differs from other broad-based
energy tax proposals, such as President Clinton's recent proposal for a BTU tax, in
the relative burdens that it places on coal, oil, and natural gas.
Enacting a carbon tax is only one of many possible policy responses to the
possibility of global warming. Such responses can be divided, following Nordhaus
(1991), into three broad categories: amelioration, abatement, and prevention.
Ameliorative actions focus on offsetting the effects of a warmer climate if and
when they occur. They include migration, increased use of air conditioning in
regions that are affected by global warming, and shifting patterns of industry and
land use in particular areas. The second group of policies, which focus on abating
the effects of global warming as they occur, might include painting roof-tops and
highways white, to reflect more incoming sunlight back into space, or chemical
modifications to the oceans to encourage CO2 absorption. Finally, the third group
of policies focus on preventing the build-up of GHGs before they can affect global
climate. The carbon tax is an example of such a preventive policy.
Global climate change is a slow process, at least relative to many other
phenomena studied in economics. Most of the consequences of global warming
2occur in the middle of the next century, at the earliest. This time profile of
benefits has an important implication for comparisons of the three classes of policy
responses described above. Since the benefits of all three types of policies accrue
in the distant future, but the costs of preventive policies are incurred now, the
benefit-cost ratio for prevention policies is more sensitive to the discount rate than
the benefit-cost ratio for either abatement or amelioration policies. At high
discount rates, prevention policies look relatively unattractive. Nevertheless,
preventive policies have received nearly all of the attention in global warming
policy discussions. Part of their appeal derives from a concern with worst-case
scenarios. Because atmospheric carbon dioxide has a long half-life, reducing
emissions today provides a margin of insurance against future discoveries of
adverse effects. Part of the preventive policies' appeal is clearly political, however.
Enacting an environmental tax increase enables politicians to claim that they have
taken immediate action on the global warming "problem."
The possibility of global climate change raises a host of new research
questions for economists. Many are more novel, and some might say more
interesting, than the analysis of the taxes and subsidies that are aimed at
preventing GHG emissions. Yet in the last few years, a substantial volume of
research has considered the design of taxes to slow GHG emissions and the
economic effects of such policies. In this paper, I summarize the insights that
have emerged from this work.
The paper begins explaining that while efficiency considerations create a
presumption for using coordinated international policies to alter GHG emissions, the
prospects for such action are bleak. It then focuses on the public finance of
carbon taxes at the national level, considering the design of such taxes as well as
their incidence across and within nations. The next part of the paper focuses on
GHG emission policies that could be enacted in less developed countries, such as
the elimination of fossil fuel subsidies and other policies to slow deforestation. A
brief conclusion suggests several promising directions for future study.
Prosoects for Coordinated International Action
There is a strong theoretical, if not practical, presumption that actions
concerned with global climate change should be taken at a supranational level.
National emission abatement policies are likely to select inefficient emission targets
for several reasons. First, and most important, they neglect the benefits from
emission reduction that accrue to other nations, and therefore tend to select too
little emission control. Second, no single nation acting alone can stabilize GHG
emissions; this makes it difficult to marshall support for any action at all. Third,
international competition can undermine environmental policy-making. If one
nation enacts a policy to reduce a particular class of emissions, polluters with high
abatement costs may move to other nations with less stringent emissions
standards. As nations compete with each other to retain internationally mobile
factors, they may be caught in a "race to the bottom" with respect to
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environmental policy. Finally, unilateral national policies are unlikely to achieve the
least-cost method of reducing emissions, since they do not trade off opportunities
for emissions reduction in different countries. Hoel (1993) discusses the gains
from multilateral environmental action, and Martin et al. (1992) present empirical
evidence on the cost savings from multilateral rather than unilateral policies to
reduce GHG emissions, with a focus on the European case.
In spite of these efficiency arguments, coordinated international action is
difficult to achieve. Without a system of international property rights, nor any
associated mechanism for enforcing property claims or adjudicating disputes, it is
difficult to develop market-based solutions for global environmental problems.
International coalitions for environmental action are fundamentally voluntary
associations which function only when all nations benefit from participation. There
is wide disparity in the costs and benefits of different policies across nations on
many environmental problems, including global climate change. The central task of
designing a successful environmental accord is therefore to find compensation
mechanisms, such as aid or other transfers, that will draw the "losers" from
environmental polices into the coalition. If wealthy nations with the resources to
make transfers that convince other nations to participate in an agreement are not
committed to a global environmental accord, or if they choose to free-ride on the
actions of other nations, the prospects for success are limited.
Measuring the costs and benefits of global climate change for an individual
nation, and even the world, involves substantial uncertainties. Nordhaus (1994)
5surveys much of the work to date. One stylized fact is that currently developing
nations, which tend to derive higher shares of GDP from agriculture than their
developed neighbors, are more sensitive to climate change than currently
developed nations. Developing nations are also more likely to be affected by some
of the other aspects of global climate change. For example, Cline (1992) lists the
50 nations with the highest predicted costs as a share of GNP of adapting to rising
sea levels, one of the consequences of global warming. New Zealand is the only
developed nation in his list. For some nations, such as Canada and Russia, global
warming might actually prove beneficial and raise agricultural yields. Nordhaus
(1991) concludes that the potential costs to the United States of a warming earth
will be modest, at least over the next century.
One of the key challenges in forging any cooperative agreement on climate
change is the poor alignment between the burdens of reducing current CO2
emissions, which fall on a small group of nations, and the benefits of such actions,
which are distributed more widely. Since developed nations account for most
current GHG emissions, they would bear a disproportionate share of the costs of
policies to lower these emissions. The United States and Canada currently
account for 25 percent of world CO2 emissions. Europe and the former Soviet
Union account for 40 percent of the total, and Japan for another 5 percent (World
Resources Institute, 1991). The emission shares of currently-developed nations
diminish as one looks further into the future. The most rapid growth in CO2
emissions over the next century is projected to occur in China, the former Soviet
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Union, and other developing nations. These are the nations that bear the heaviest
burdens of long-term slow-growth policies.
Some optimists argue that the problems of achieving coordinated international
action can be solved, and they point to the 1987 Montreal Protocol, which
established a timetable for phasing out production of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs),
as a model of concerted international environmental action. Ninety-three nations
signed the Montreal Protocol, which set targets for the reduction of global CFC
production. The lessons of this case therefore warrant some elaboration.'
The Montreal Protocol specified CFC production targets based on a nation's
1986 production of CFCs, with some allowance for production capacity under
contract but not yet operational in 1986. Developing nations were permitted to
expand their CFC use between 1986 and 1996, and to begin reduction after 1996.
The Protocol also provided for transfers to less developed countries to facilitate the
adoption of substitute products. This provision helped build global consensus for
the agreement by defusing the argument of the less developed countries that their
growth would be stunted if they were forced to rely on expensive alternatives to
CFCs. The Protocol has no explicit enforcement mechanism, but experience since
1986 has been encouraging: global CFC production has declined faster than the
Protocol targets.
'Benedick (1991) provides a detailed summary of the political negotiations
leading up to the Montreal Accord.
There are several reasons why the CFC experience may not generalize to other
international environmental problems, such as global climate change. First, there
was greater scientific concensus on the nature and the immediacy of the "ozone
problem" than on the link between greenhouse gas emissions and global warming.
A substantial body of research suggested that CFC emissions were reducing
stratospheric ozone levels, and the discovery of a "hole" in the ozone layer above
the Antarctic in the early 1980s catalyzed world action to stop ozone depletion.
Second, CFCs are economically much less important than fossil fuels.
Chloroflourocarbon consumption accounted for a trivial share of world GDP prior to
the Montreal accord, while fossil fuel consumption is a major economic activity in
most nations. Production of CFCs was concentrated among a small set of
multinational chemical companies who were also the natural suppliers of CFC
substitutes. Some have even suggested that some CFC producers suDoorted a ban
because they expected to exercise greater market power if current CFC users were
forced to switch to substitutes (UNEP, 1990). In contrast, there is wide dispersion
in the suppliers of fossil fuels and possible alternatives.
Third, the ozone depletion problem appeared immediate when the Montreal
Protocol was signed, in marked contrast to the long horizons involved in the
current policy debate regarding GHGs. After the discovery of the ozone hole, CFC
emissions were linked with the rising incidence of skin cancer cases. It was
therefore possible to identify a near-term gain that could be weighed against the
8cost of phasing out CFC production. In contrast, policies to reduce greenhouse
gases burden current generations for the benefit of future generations.
Even though there were fewer obstacles to reaching international agreement
on CFCs than on greenhouse gas emissions, negotiations leading to the Montreal
Protocol took several years and frequently threatened to unravel. The Protocol's
fund for technology transfer has not been fully funded, a pattern that underscores
the difficulty of convincing developed nations to commit resources to international
organizations focused on global environmental improvement.
The experience with other attempts to achieve multinational environmental
cooperation is less encouraging than the case of CFCs. For example, thirteen
nations, including the United Kingdom and Poland, have not signed the 1985
Helsinki Protocol on sulfur oxides (acid rain) in Europe. Sulfur oxides are
economically more significant than CFCs, and the inter-country differences in the
net benefits of Protocol participation are larger than for CFCs. The failure of the
Helsinki negotiations may therefore provide a better indication of the prospect for a
global warming accord than the success in Montreal. Recent proposals for a
carbon tax in the European Community, which are explicitly conditioned on similar
actions by other nations, also suggest that CO2 reduction will be more difficult
than CFC reduction.
Although coordinated international action to adopt a carbon tax or similar
policy currently 'seems unlikely, many nations appear committed to unilateral action
to reduce GHGs. Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands have already adopted
carbon taxes, even though unilateral action by these nations can exert only a trivial
effect on the growth rate of global greenhouse gas emissions.2 I now consider
several aspects of unilateral carbon tax design and incidence, as well as the
potential difficulties that arise in implementing unilateral taxes in a global economy.
The Anatomy of a Carbon Tax
The carbon tax on each fossil fuel is proportional to the amount of carbon
dioxide emitted when it is burned.3 Coal produces more carbon dioxide per unit of
energy than either oil or natural gas, so it faces the highest carbon tax rate. If the
combustion of each fuel is assumed to affect the environment only through its
effect on carbon emissions, then the optimal Pigouvian tax on each fuel will be
proportional to its CO2 emissions.4
Table 1 describes the carbon tax in more detail. The first few rows offer
information on carbon emissions, energy content measured in BTUs (British
2Haugland, Lunde, and Roland (1992) describe the structure of carbon tax
policies that have been adopted in Scandinavian countries. Many of the
institutional details have important effects on the effects of these taxes. In
Sweden, for example, there is a cap on the share of a firm's sales that can be
collected; this effectively results in a zero marginal tax rate for many firms.
3Greenhouse gas tax policy should not be limited simply to taxing CO2.
Emissions of all gases that contribute to global warming, such as methane and
nitrous oxides, should be taxed at the same rate per unit of global warming
potential (GWP). Nordhaus (1990) and Schmalensee (1993) discuss how to
measure GWP.
4When the government can raise revenue through lump-sum taxes, then the
optimal tax on each good equals the externality imposed by its consumption.
Diamond (1973), Sandmo (1975), and Poterba (1993) develop this point and
consider the effect of restricting the government's set of tax instruments.
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Thermal Units), and recent prices of the various fuels.5 The next two rows show
the impact of a $5/ton carbon tax. It would raise coal prices by 13 percent, and
increase the consumer prices of oil and natural gas by 4 percent and 5 percent
respectively. The table also compares the tax rates on different fuels from a
carbon tax with those from a BTU tax, a tax on the energy content of each fuel,
set for coal at the same level as the $5/ton carbon tax. The BTU tax places a
higher relative burden on natural gas than on the other fuels. Because externalities
are associated with end-products of combustion, not with energy use per se, there
is a strong rationale for basing Pigouvian taxes on emissions rather than other fuel
characteristics such as BTU content.
It is difficult to translate Table 1 into practice for two reasons. First, fossil
fuel combustion creates many potential externalities other than global climate
change. In this case, the optimal taxes on various fossil fuels can differ from those
prescribed by a simple analysis of relative CO2 output. Various studies, described
in Viscusi (1992), have evaluated the local air pollution and other externalities
associated with fossil fuel use. These studies generally suggest that the negative
externalities associated with coal combustion exceed those from other fossil fuels,
implying that the extra tax burden on coal should exceed that on other fuels.
STax rates are sometimes specified per ton of carbon, and other times per ton
of carbon dioxide emitted. Since the atomic weights of carbon and oxygen are 12
and 8 respectively, a ton of carbon corresponds to 2.33 tons of CO2. Tax rates
can be translated accordingly.
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The second problem in implementing the tax rates in Table 1 is that most
developed nations already tax fossil fuels. Many of the existing taxes are justified
by revenue needs rather than externality correction. In the United States, for
example, the current tax rate on gasoline is just over 30 percent of the producer
price, while in Britain, Sweden, and other European nations the tax rate often
exceeds 60 percent of the producer price. Table 2 shows the existing implicit
taxes on each of the three major fossil fuels in the G-7 nations; negative signs
imply that a fuel is subsidized. The table confirms the widely known pattern that
energy tax burdens in the United States are low relative to those in other nations,
but also shows the disparity of the net tax treatment of coal across industrial
countries. Germany, Britain, and Japan all provide subsidies to their coal
industries. How should the carbon tax be combined with pre-existing taxes? In
the unlikely case where existing fossil fuel taxes have been set optimally for
Ramsey and Pigouvian reasons, and if the potential effect of fossil fuels on global
climate can be viewed as a previously-ignored externality, then the carbon tax
should be added to the existing tax. Failing this case, it is difficult to make strong
statements about the combination of the carbon tax and other levies.
The International Incidence of a Carbon Tax
If enacted in the United States today, a tax of $5/ton on carbon such as that
considered in Table 1 would slow, but not stabilize, the growth of CO2 emissions.
It would raise between $10 and $15 billion annually. A carbon tax of $100/ton,
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which could result in U.S. emissions of CO2 in the early part of the next century
below levels in the late 1980s (see Congressional Budget Office (1990)), would
raise approximately $200 billion, or more than 3 percent of GNP. Even in Japan,
where energy consumption per dollar of GNP is lower than in the United States,
revenues from such a tax would be more than 1 percent of GNP. Schelling (1992)
observes that the sheer magnitude of these revenue flows represent an important
obstacle to any coordinated international action that involves revenue collection by
a supra-national organization. Few developed countries are likely to cede control
over revenues of this magnitude to an international organization.
Practical analyses of carbon taxes must therefore focus on unilateral tax
policies without revenue transfers across countries. Whalley and Wigle (1991) use
a computable general equilibrium model to evaluate the effect of enacting similar
carbon taxes in all countries, with each country keeping the revenue it collects.
Their findings underscore the difference in incidence between a carbon tax levied
on consumption of fossil fuels, and a similar tax levied on production. When
nations are permitted to keep the revenue they collect, a consumption-based tax
places a much higher burden on oil-producing countries than a production-based
tax. A consumption-based carbon tax that would reduce CO2 emissions by 50
percent would reduce GDP by 4 percent in North America, 1 percent in Europe,
and by 19 percent in oil exporting countries. This contrasts with an equal-value
tax on production, which raises GDP by 5 percent in oil-producing countries, and
reduces GDP by 4 percent in both Europe and North America. The key difference
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between these policies is that with the production tax, fossil fuel exporters receive
the revenue from the tax.
Whalley and Wigle's (1991) estimates, and those from other computable
general equilibrium (CGE) models, reflect the loss in output that results from higher
fossil fuel prices." Further analysis with these models suggests that these output
losses are sensitive to the structure of pre-existing taxes, on both fossil fuels and
other goods. Goulder (1993) and Bovenberg and de Mooij (1993), for example,
show that carbon fuel taxes interact in important ways with labor income taxes.
Labor supply depends on the real after-tax wage measured in terms of consumer
prices. In acting as an indirect tax, carbon taxes reduce the real after-tax wage.7
Enacting a carbon tax affects the government's budget as well as relative
prices. Because substantial tax increases are likely to have contractionary macro-
economic effects, some proposals call for coupling a carbon tax increase with
other tax cuts to generate a revenue-neutral policy. In European countries that rely
on indirect taxes for significant revenues, a natural policy would involve reducing
the VAT or other excise tax rates. For the United States, it would be possible to
"Dean and Hoeller (1992) survey long-run results from six general equilibrium
models, and emphasize the substantial difference in their results. Joskow's (1992)
discussion of the results from the Jorgenson-Slesnick-Wilcoxen (1992) model
illustrates some of the difficulties associated with the use of CGE models for
assessing greenhouse gas policy.
7The after-tax wage is (1-t)w/p(1 +s), where w denotes the nominal wage, p
the producer price level, t the marginal income tax rate, and s the average indirect
tax rate. Carbon taxes raise s. This distorts labor supply, and the cost of this
distortion depends on the pre-existing level of (1-t)/(1 +s), the initial tax wedge.
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reduce income taxes to offset carbon tax revenues. The possibility of using carbon
tax revenues to cut other tax rates has spawned a recent debate on "revenue
recycling," with several studies claiming that adopting a carbon tax could yield
efficiency gains rather than deadweight losses. Goulder (1993) shows that the
efficiency cost of a carbon tax is much attenuated if the tax proceeds finance
other tax cuts, such as reductions in the personal income tax. Shackleton et al.
(1992) claim still more, arguing that if carbon tax revenues are used to reduce
capital tax burdens, for example by instituting an investment tax credit, then the
carbon tax can actually raise national output.
Initially, the revenue-recycling argument seems fallacious. If the status quo
includes some extremely inefficient taxes, then almost any new tax can generate
an efficiency improvement. Simply demonstrating that raising the carbon tax and
reducing other onerous taxes would lead to an efficiency gain does not imply that
carbon taxes should be adopted. Rather, one must compare the carbon tax policy
with the set of all feasible policies that could reduce the onerous taxes and achieve
a balanced budget. On reflection, however, the revenue-recycling argument may
make more sense. If there is a causal link between enacting a carbon tax and
cutting particular other taxes, perhaps because of political constraints on raising
existing taxes, and if there are no other ways to enact changes in these other
taxes, then it is appropriate to consider how the funds are used in evaluating the
net benefit from a carbon tax. Absent a strong basis for linking enactment of a
carbon tax to other particular tax changes, a plausible assumption is that carbon
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taxes would be paired with a proportionate reduction in all existing revenue
sources.
In addition to the uncertainy about how carbon tax revenue would be used,
which has an important effect on how the carbon tax affects output, there is some
disagreement about whether higher fossil fuel prices affect the rate of economic
growth. Because growth rate effects compound from year to year, they have the
potential to dwarf many of the other effects of changing fossil fuel taxes.
However, the available empirical evidence about these effects is not conclusive
(see Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1993) and Weyant (1994)). The rate of productivity
growth in many developed countries declined at roughly the same time as the
1973 oil price shock. Whether these two developments are causally related,
however, is an open question, and warrants further analysis.
The computational models described above yield results on the long-run
output reduction that might accompany higher taxes on fossil fuels. These output
reductions can not be viewed in the same light, however, as output reductions
from traditional distortionary taxes that are enacted to raise revenue. Since carbon
taxes are Pigouvian taxes, at the optimal tax rate the present value of the marginal
output losses associated with the tax would precisely equal the present value of
the marginal gains from reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Even if the taxes are
not set optimally, if there is some social value to reducing GHG emissions, the
foregone output associated with a carbon tax overstates the net social cost of
these policies.
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Are Carbon Taxes Regressive?
One of the most frequent objections to raising fossil fuel taxes in most
developed countries is that such taxes fall most heavily on low-income households.
This regressivity argument has been a central component of opposition to higher
gasoline taxes in the United States. The underlying basis for the argument is
simply that the ratio of consumption to income declines as one moves up the
income distribution (see Poterba (1989)).
There are now several studies of the distributional burdens of carbon taxes in
the United States and other nations (see Smith (1992) for evidence for Europe, and
Jorgenson, Slesnick, and Wilcoxen (1992) and Poterba (1991) for results for the
United States). These studies suggest that simple analyses of the ratio of
expenditures on fossil fuels, relative to income, substantially overstate the
regressivity of such taxes. If tax burdens are analyzed relative to lifetime income,
the fossil fuel taxes appear less regressive than when compared with current
income. In addition, most developed nations have a variety of auxilliary fiscal
policies that reduce, or could be used to reduce, any adverse distributional effects
of carbon taxes. For example, many transfer programs are already indexed for
price changes. Transfer recipients are therefore partly insured against tax-induced
changes in consumer prices. Carbon tax proposals could also be coupled with
modifications in income tax schedules to redistribute purchasing power to low-
income households.
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The possibility of coupling carbon taxes with other policy changes, whether
to achieve distributional ends or for other reasons, highlights an important
limitation of most existing models of these taxes. Modellers usually evaluate
"pure" policies, such as carbon taxes levied on all fossil fuels. In practice, policies
will inevitably be enacted with exemptions and other special provisions that both
reduce their power to limit greenhouse gas emissions, and magnify their adverse
effect on the amount of output lost per unit of emissions abatement. The revealed
preference of policy-makers in many countries for command-and-control rather
than efficient, market-based pollution control policies, underscores the potential
divergence between actual and theoretical policies.
Macroeconomic Effects: "Self Inflicted Wounds"
While most discussions of the economic effects of carbon taxes focus on long-
term output effects, enacting such taxes could also have short-term
macroeconomic effects. Even a balanced-budget carbon tax can have adverse
short-run effects on output if nominal wages and prices respond slowly to higher
taxes. To illustrate this possibility, consider a carbon tax that is coupled with a
reduction in labor income tax rates. The carbon tax represents an increase in the
overall indirect tax rate, and for a fixed set of producer prices, it will raise the
consumer price level. If the nominal money supply is constant -- that is, if the
monetary authority does not accomodate the carbon tax -- then higher consumer
prices will translate into a smaller real money stock. This amounts to a monetary
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contraction, a "self inflicted wound" in macroeconomic terms, and to lower
aggregate output.8 Slow phase-in of a carbon tax would blunt these effects.
Implementation Issues in an Open Economy
One additional theoretical argument for supra-national rather than unilateral
national actions to curb GHG emissions involves the difficulties of implementing
policies such as carbon taxes in open economies. Most national-level carbon tax
proposals call for taxing imports of fossil fuels in the same way as domestic
production. This does not completely solve the problem of equal treatment of
foreign and domestic production of fossil-fuel intensive goods, however. If imports
of such goods are not taxed, there will be production inefficiencies as production
of these intermediate goods will be diverted from domestic locations. Poterba
(1991) argues that border taxes on a few classes of imports -- for example, steel,
autos, and chemicals -- could avoid most of these problems. In practice, however,
it might be difficult to adopt such "environmental tariffs" under current GATT
rules.
Nations with unilateral carbon taxes might also choose to provide tax rebates
to exporters of goods with high fossil fuel content, to avoid adverse competitive
8Poterba, Rotemberg, and Summers (1986) suggest that a 3% of GNP shift
from direct to indirect taxation, for example, from an income tax to a carbon tax,
would reduce real GNP by .6% in the quarter when the tax change took effect and
cumulatively by 3% of annual GNP over the policy's first three years. The
Congressional Budget Office (1990) presents more specific results on the
macroeconomic effects of carbon taxes with various assumptions about other
policy responses.
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effects in international trade. Such export rebates and related provisions have
been enacted in some of the Nordic countries' carbon taxes, with the result that
these taxes provide no marginal disincentive for CO2 emissions for large firms
engaged in export trade (see Haugland, Lunde, and Roland (1992)).
Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Less Developed Nations
The discussion so far has concentrated on unilateral policies to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions in developed countries. Efficient policies to slow GHG
emissions, however, are likely to involve some reductions in emissions from less
developed countries (LDCs) as well. Mors (1991) estimates that the costs of
reducing CO2 emissions in less developed countries may be only one-fourth of the
cost in developed nations, mainly because many LDCs have relatively inefficient
energy utilization systems. There are important differences between analyzing
policies for controlling GHG emissions from LDCs and developed countries. These
differences arise because the same policies that could be used in developed
nations, such as carbon taxes, might have different effects in LDCs, and because
there are new policy options, such as programs to slow deforestation, that must be
considered.
The effects of raising fossil fuel prices in LDCs has received less research
attention than the comparable problem for developed countries. The work that has
been done suggests important heterogeneity in the likely effects of such policies on
different LDCs. Blitzer et al. (1992), for example, contrast the effect of a carbon
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tax on India and Egypt, and recognize that differences in the relative use of coal
and other fossil fuels, as well as differences in economic structure, play an
important role in determining the effects of such taxes on individual nations.
Less developed countries also differ from developed countries in their current
tax treatment of fossil fuels. While most industrial nations tax these fuels, many
LDCs currently subsidize the direct consumption of fossil fuels, and the indirect
consumption through electricity. Table 3 presents suggestive information on these
subsidies, drawn from Shah and Larsen (1991). The World Bank (1992) estimates
that eliminating fossil fuel subsidies could reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 29
percent in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and by 11 percent in
currently developing nations. Combined, these reductions would yield an 11
percent reduction in current global emissions of carbon dioxide. Eliminating these
subsidies would also confront consumers in the subsidizing nations with world
market prices for their fuels, thereby improving the efficiency of global energy
consumption."
While existing energy subsidies may be difficult to justify on efficiency grounds,
they may serve distributional objectives within countries. This makes the claim
that subsidy removal provides a "free lunch" overly optimistic. Viewed from the
perspective of a social planner with distributional as well as efficiency objectives,
eliminating the subsidies may have real costs. This is supported by a cursory
9Just as introducing new carbon taxes would have adjustment costs, removing
current subsidies would result in economic dislocation. These could be minimized
by gradual phase-out.
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analysis of fossil fuel subsidies in the developed world, where these subsidies are
invariably the result of domestic political pressures. In the United Kingdom, for
example, subsidies to coal use sustain mine employment in particularly depressed
regions. In the United States, despite overwhelming evidence that scrubbing high-
sulfur coal is not a cost-effective way to reduce sulfur oxide emissions, clean air
policy for more than a decade required scrubbers on some power plants. This was
largely due to the political influence of high-sulfur coal miners.
The political economy of fossil fuel subsidies in LDCs poses an important
impediment to efficient global action to reduce GHG emissions. A cost-effective
way to surmount these internal political problems could involve resource transfers
from some developed nations to some LDCs, explicitly targetted at compensation
for the "losers" from policy reforms. Finding an institutional structure for such
transfers, however, confronts the problems of coordinated international action that
were describes above.
The importance of deforestation in contributing to GHG emissions from less
developed countries raises a second set of differences between global climate
policies in developed and developing nations. Forest-burning currently accounts for
approximately one-fifth of anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide (World
Resources Institute, 1991). In Brazil, deforestation is three times as important as
fossil fuel consumption as a source of CO, emissions (Shunker, Salles, and Rios-
Velilla (1992)). Some forecasts call for rapid increases in the rate of deforestation,
particularly in Amazonia, in the early part of the next century. Most rain forest
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burning occurs as the forest is converted to agricultural use by new settlers, so
policies to slow this settlement are candidates for reducing the level of greenhouse
gas emissions.
Before examining the role of taxes and other government policies that affect
the rate of deforestation, it is essential to recognize that not all deforestation
creates greenhouse gases. Living forests are an important carbon sink:
photosynthesis draws CO2 out of the atmosphere. Cutting tropical hardwoods for
furniture construction, and replacing the felled trees with new growth, therefore
has the potential to absorb greenhouse gases. Burning tropical forests either to
clear land or for firewood, or failing to replace forest that is cut for lumber, does
contribute to the ambient level of greenhouse gases.
Governments in LDCs can employ several different policy instruments to
affect forest utilization. The first and probably most important set of policies
concern incentives for settlement and agricultural expansion in currently-forested
areas. In Brazil, for example, the national government has historically encouraged
settlement in rain forest regions. Binswanger (1989) and Reis and Margulis (1991)
explain that credit policies, infrastructure development, and other government
subsidies played a key role in the rise of cattle-ranching in Amazonia. They further
argue that given Amazonia's soil, such ranching would not be economically
attractive without the government subsidies.
Removing existing subsidies that encourage deforestation parallel removing
fossil fuel subsidies in promising an efficiency-enhancing means to slow GHG
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emissions. They are likely to be particularly cost-effective policies. Cline (1992)
concludes that the cost of reducing global carbon emissions by removing
government incentives to deforest are only several dollars per ton. This is
substantially less than most estimates of emission-reduction costs in developed
nations.
A second set of policy instruments that affect forest clearing are taxes on
logging and other related activities. Panayotou and Sungsuwan (1989) study
deforestation in Thailand, and conclude that taxes on resource rents would have
significant effects in discouraging logging in environmentally sensitive areas.
Empirical analysis of such policy proposals depends on a set of elasticities, such as
that for logging activity with respect to net log prices, that are in many cases are
known with very little precision. The prospective importance of carbon dioxide
emissions from the Third World suggests that estimating these parameters is an
important research priority.
Finally, land tenure rules have important effects on the utilization of tropical
forests. One of the central problems in Amazonia, for example, where land claims
are difficult to enforce, is that land users do not take a long-term perspective in
making land use decisions. Imperfect property rights reduce the cost of obtaining
land, and lead tenants to maximize short-run returns, often by burning the forest
and exploiting the resulting land for only brief periods. Weak property rights
discourage replanting of forest. The reform of land tenure rules in LDCs is a
complex problem, and one that has many potential effects other than those
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concerned with global climate change. Nevertheless, this is a type of policy that
could significantly affect greenhouse gas emissions.
Conclusion
This paper has sidestepped the single most important question in designing a
carbon tax: what is the optimal tax rate? In principle, this question is simple to
answer: the optimal carbon tax equates the present discounted value of the net
externalities from a ton of carbon emitted today with the marginal cost of emission
reduction, making appropriate correction for distributional differences in the
incidence of benefits and costs. Even after several years of intense research
activity on carbon taxes and global warming, however, there is great uncertainty
concerning the optimal carbon tax rate. While such uncertainty is not
unprecedented in tax policy discussions (what is the optimal tax rate on capital
gains?), the sources of this uncertainty suggest promising directions for future
research. Two aspects of this uncertainty deserve comment.
One source of uncertainty about optimal carbon taxes concerns the
appropriate discounting for time and risk in considering the policy's costs and
benefits. Chichilnisky and Heal (1994) survey many of the issues related to this
question. Cline (1992) has emphasized that policies to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions are more attractive at low discount rates and when the policy analysis
involves a longer time horizon. Yet there is little agreement on what discount rate
is appropriate for such calculations.
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A second source of uncertainty concerns the economic consequences of a
given level of greenhouse gas accumulation. The efforts by Nordhaus (1991) and
Cline (1992) to estimate how the U.S. would be affected by global warming
suggest the immensity of the calibration exercise. The task is complicated further
by the sensitivity of the loss estimates to events that occur with low probability.
Even if the mean and median outcomes are not particularly costly, outcomes with
one chance in ten may be very costly to the United States and other nations. It is
difficult enough to estimate the mean effects of various levels of GHG emissions;
trying to specify the entire distribution of such outcomes, as well as the probability
of remote outcomes such as shifts in the Gulf Stream, is an extraordinary research
challenge for physical scientists. Economics must be ready, however, to help
evaluate such forecasts as they become available, and to focus attention on areas
where uncertainty reduction is most valuable.
Given the significant cost uncertainties associated with policies to slow
greenhouse gas emissions, caution is likely to be a key characteristic of optimal
policies. Low carbon taxes, enacted on a nation-by-nation basis, can establish the
mechanism for revenue collection and provide some evidence on how these taxes
affect economic activity. Immediate enactment of a high-rate carbon tax would
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Unit of Measure Ton Barrel 103 cu.ft.
Tons of Carbon/
Unit of Fuel .605 .130 .016
Carbon Emissions/
Billion BTUs .025 .020 .015
BTU Content 24.2 6.5 1.07
Average Mine-Mouth
or Wellhead Price, 1989 $23.02 $17.70 $1.78
$5/ton Carbon Tax:
Absolute Tax 3.17 0.65 0.08
Percentage of Price 13% 4% 5%
BTU Tax:
Percentage of Price 13% 5% 7%
Notes: Poterba (1991) with new calculations relating to fuel BTU content.
Table 2: Implicit Carbon Taxes, Dollars/Ton of Carbon, G-7 Nations, 1988
------ Coal Oi---l & Ol Prod--ucts Natural Gas----------------------------------------------------------------
Coal Oil & Oil Products Natural Gas
-----------------------------------------------------------
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Table 3: Subsidies to Fossil Fuel Consumption
Ratio of Domestic to Border Price
Country Coal Oil Natural Gas
China .84 .48 .40
Former USSR (1991) .50 .49 .35
Poland .31 .77 .50
India .86 .90 ---
United Kingdom .90 --- ---
South Africa .50 --- ---
Czechoslovakia .40 .85 ---
Mexico --- .48 ---
Source: Shah and Larsen (1991, Table B1.----------------------------------------------------------
Source: Shah and Larsen (1991), Table Bi.
